

SmartAuth:

Multi-Factor Authentication
using Smart Card and
Android on Web



Muhammad Shahbaz

National University of Sciences & Technology
www.nust.edu.pk



NUST
Defining futures

AUTHENTICATION



2018

**Chinese
resume
leak**

Facebook
54,000,000

**Marriott
Hotels**
383,000,000

Twitter
330,000,000

2017

**Friend
Finder
Network**
412,000,000

Yahoo
500,000,000

2016

MOTIVATION

- **User authentication**
- **Popularity of android smartphones**
- **Smart cards**



OBJECTIVE



An alternative approach for a secure user authentication which provides mutual entity verification using smartphone and smart card for web.



AND
OR



SOMETHING YOU
KNOW

SOMETHING YOU
ARE

SOMETHING YOU
HAVE

VERIFIED

SOMETHING YOU KNOW

- **Top password**
123456



Username : admin
Password : admin


SOMETHING YOU KNOW

• Password reuse

- Crucial problem
- AVG 3.9 times same password

2014 - Australian and New Zealand iCloud users were affected, Apple devices got locked for ransom.

<https://www.zdnet.com/article/icloud-not-compromised-in-apple-id-attack-apple/>
<https://security.googleblog.com/2017/11/new-research-understanding-root-cause.html>



What Information Was Involved?

Yahoo Breach!

The stolen user account information may have included names, email addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, hashed passwords (using MD5) and, in some cases, encrypted or unencrypted security questions and answers. Not all of these

<https://pixelprivacy.com/resources/reusing-passwords/>

SOMETHING YOU KNOW

IT'S MY
GRANDMA'S
NAME.

MARIA

OHH ****!
NOW YOU
KNOW MY
PASSWORD

WHAT'S YOUR
PASSWORD?

WHAT'S YOUR
GRANDMA'S
NAME?


<https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6511943014401867776>
<https://security.googleblog.com/2017/11/new-research-understanding-root-kit-ware.html>

SOMETHING YOU KNOW

- **Password Checkup
Chrome Extension
by Google**



Learn about unsafe accounts
wherever you sign in




<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/password-checkup/pncabnpgcfmaikkjpalodfhjciecino?hl=en>

WEAKEST LINK



DEFENSE IN DEPTH




SOMETHING YOU ARE


- **Social Engineering And Emerging
Multimedia Technologies - BSides
Munich 2018
by Carl Schoeller**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUV5sBCHis&index=14&list=PLBN5HIRDvZ-etExLvF5766VOD0CkZTSZx>


SOMETHING YOU ARE




SOMETHING YOU HAVE




SS7 VULNERABILITY




SS7 VULNERABILITY



SS7 VULNERABILITY



SS7 VULNERABILITY




SOMETHING YOU HAVE

Authenticator



<https://blog.trezor.io/why-you-should-never-use-google-authenticator-again-e166d09d4324>



SOMETHING YOU HAVE






<https://www.flickr.com/photos/zapthedingbat/4500822010/>


SMART CARD

- OpenPlatform
- JCOP




SMART CARD

- OpenPlatform
- JCOP




SMART CARD



CHIP
MAGNIFIED 1000×



Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2004). *Smart card handbook*. John Wiley & Sons.



electron beam tester

RAM CELLS
MAGNIFIED 3000×

SMART CARD




https://www.infineon.com/export/sites/default/media/press/image/press_photo/CoM_for_GovID_en.jpg

Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2004). *Smart card handbook*. John Wiley & Sons.

TRUSTED PARTY




SECURE NOW?





PROPOSED SOLUTION


SmartAuth, multi-factor authentication using smart card and android on web with public key cryptography.


























SMARTCARD MODULE

NFC Technology	Protocol Description
NfcA	NFC-A (ISO 14443-3A)
NfcB	NFC-B (ISO 14443-3B)
NfcF	NFC-F (JIS 6319-4)
NfcV	NFC-V (ISO 15693)
IsoDep	ISO-DEP (ISO 14443-4)
Ndef	NFC Forum data format
NdefFormatable	NDEF formattable


CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc field	data field	Le field
-----	-----	----	----	----------	------------	----------




header

body


APDU - Application protocol data unit
ISO/IEC 7816-4




FIPS196 ON WEB




FIPS196 ON WEB




FIPS196 ON WEB




FIPS196 ON WEB




FIPS196 ON WEB



FIPS196 ON WEB





```
root@Securage:/opt/avispa-1.1/contrib# avispa smartauth.hlpstl --ofmc
```

```
% OFMC
```

```
% Version of 2006/02/13
```

```
SUMMARY
```

```
SAFE
```

```
DETAILS
```

```
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
```

```
PROTOCOL
```

```
/opt/avispa-1.1/testsuite/results/smartauth.if
```

```
GOAL
```

```
as_specified
```

```
BACKEND
```

```
OFMC
```

```
COMMENTS
```

```
STATISTICS
```

```
parseTime: 0.00s
```

```
searchTime: 0.42s
```

```
visitedNodes: 578 nodes
```

```
depth: 10 plies
```

```
root@Securage:/opt/avispa-1.1/contrib#
```

The AVISPA logo is displayed in a large, bold, red font. The letters are stylized with a slight shadow or outline effect, giving it a three-dimensional appearance. The logo is positioned in the upper right quadrant of the image.

SECURITY ANALYSIS

Security	Defense
Mutual Entity Verification	☒
Replay Attack Defense	☒
Man-in-the-middle attack Defense	☒
Phishing Attack Protection	☒

FUTURE WORK


- **FIPS196 archived - October 19, 2015**

**Latest revision - (February 18,
1997)**

FUTURE WORK

• Elliptic Curve Cryptography

ECC Key Size	RSA Security Equivalent
224 bit	2048 bit
256 bit	3072 bit
384 bit	7680 bit
521 bit	15360 bit




<https://blog.gemalto.com/security/2015/01/27/elliptic-curve-cryptography-comes-of-age-small-keys-unlock-a-big-future/>

<https://blog.goodaudience.com/very-basic-elliptic-curve-cryptography-16c4f6c349ed>

SMARTCARD WALLET

- Bitcoin elliptic curve - Secp256k1



AWARENESS

The first step to protecting yourself is to know the most common type of frauds.

Know the threat



Phishing

Phishing is where fraudsters send emails (often appearing to be from your bank) asking you to disclose personal information. Phishing emails will try to get you to download a file or click on a link to a bogus website, which may then allow fraudsters to access your confidential bank account or card details.



Voice + phishing = Vishing

Vishing is where fraudsters call you on your home or mobile phone, pretending to be a government official or someone from your bank, and ask you to validate your identity by sharing your confidential bank account or card details.

How you can protect yourself from different threats

Always

- ✓ Use a computer or device that you trust
- ✓ Log out after finishing an online banking session
- ✓ Clear the browser cache after each session so that your account information is removed from the device
- ✓ Keep your debit & credit card number & PINs secure

Never

- x Click on unknown links that look similar to Standard Chartered online banking. Any such email is a scam/fraud

REFERENCES

- [1] CNET, "Android dominates 81 percent of world smartphone market," May 2014, accessed 18/5/2014, [Online]. Available: <http://www.cnet.com/news/android-dominates-81-percent-of-world-smartphone-market/>
- [2] IDC, "Worldwide quarterly mobile phone tracker," accessed 18/5/2014, [Online]. Available: <http://www.idc.com/tracker/showproductinfo.jsp?prodId=37>
- [3] G. Inc., "Google," accessed 19/5/2014, [Online]. Available: <http://www.google.com>
- [4] Softel, "Dad interface smart card," accessed 09/2/2016, [Online]. Available: <http://www.softel.com/>
- [5] W. Effing, *Smart card handbook*. John Wiley & Sons, 2010.
- [6] S. C. Alliance, "Smart card technology faq," accessed 11/02/2016, [Online]. Available: <http://www.smartcardalliance.org/smart-cards-faq>
- [7] S. Almqvist, P. Veerasagayam, and N. Chelankarti, "Ipsu: implicit password authentication system," in *Advanced Information Networking and Applications (WAINA), 2011 IEEE Workshops of International Conference on*. IEEE, 2011, pp. 429-435.
- [8] A. P. Sabarene and A. Stavrou, "Universal multi-factor authentication using graphical passwords," in *Signal Image Technology and Internet Based Systems, 2008. SITIS'08. IEEE International Conference on*. IEEE, 2008, pp. 625-632.
- [9] P. F. H. Schneider, "Something you know, have, or are," accessed 16/02/2016, [Online]. Available: <https://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs513/2005fa/multifactorpeople.html>
- [10] G. A. Miller, "The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information," *Psychological review*, vol. 63, no. 2, p. 81, 1956.
- [11] H. Schlichter and J. Sametinger, "Secure and usable authentication on mobile devices," in *Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Advances in Mobile Computing & Multimedia*. ACM, 2012, pp. 257-262.
- [12] J. Bonneau, "The science of guessing: analyzing an organized corpus of 70 million passwords," in *Security and Privacy (SP), 2012 IEEE Symposium on*. IEEE, 2012, pp. 528-552.
- [13] M. J. Quinn, "Analysis of real-world passwords for social media sites," 2015.
- [14] H.-M. Sun, Y.-H. Chen, and Y.-H. Lin, "Ipsu: A user authentication protocol resistant to password stealing and password reuse attacks," *Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 651-663, 2012.
- [15] D. Florencio and C. Herley, "A large-scale study of web password habits," in *Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web*. ACM, 2007, pp. 657-666.
- [16] "British airways frequent-flyer accounts hacked," accessed 17/02/2016, [Online]. Available: <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/29/british-airways-frequent-flyer-accounts-hacked>
- [17] "vday suffers massive security breach, all users must change their passwords," accessed 17/02/2016, [Online]. Available: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonkelly/2014/05/21/vday-suffers-massive-security-breach-all-users-must-their-change-passwords/#1e78d1a63e15>
- [18] "icloud not compromised in apple id attack: Apple," [Online]. Available: <http://www.cnet.com/article/icloud-not-compromised-in-apple-id-attack-apple/>
- [19] A. De Luca, E. Von Zerschwitz, N. D. H. Nguyen, M.-E. Moura, E. Bolegui, M. P. Siqueira, and M. Langheinrich, "Back-of-device authentication on smartphones," in *Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*. ACM, 2013, pp. 2289-2298.
- [20] T. Vieho, D. Votipka, and N. Christin, "All your droid are belong to us: A survey of current android attacks," in *WOOT*, 2011, pp. 81-96.
- [21] G. Inc., "Dashboards," accessed 27/2/2016, [Online]. Available: <http://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html>
- [22] —, "Android," accessed 19/5/2014, [Online]. Available: <http://www.android.com/>
- [23] G. Inc., "Introduction to android," accessed 19/5/2014, [Online]. Available: <http://developer.android.com/guide/index.html>
- [24] —, "Application fundamentals," accessed 19/5/2014, [Online]. Available: <http://developer.android.com/guide/components/fundamentals.html>
- [25] G. Inc., "Android debug bridge," accessed 24/5/2014, [Online]. Available: <http://developer.android.com/tools/help/adb.html>
- [26] G. Inc., "Near field communication," accessed 22 May 2015, [Online]. Available: <http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/nfc/ndc.html>
- [27] —, "Admired id," accessed 22 May 2015, [Online]. Available: <http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/nfc/advanced-id.html#tag-tech>
- [28] GlobalPlatform, "Globalplatform," accessed 02/3/2016, [Online]. Available: <http://www.globalplatform.org/>
- [29] Z. Chun, *Java card technology for smart cards: architecture and programmer's guide*. Addison-Wesley Professional, 2000.
- [30] G. Barthe, G. Dolev, L. Jekelovic, B. Serpette, and S. M. De Souza, "A formal executable semantics of the password platform," in *ESOP*, vol. 1, Springer, 2001, pp. 202-219.

THANK YOU!



[@M_Shahbaz_A](#)



<https://www.linkedin.com/in/mr-muhammad-shahbaz/>



mr.shahbaz.aslam@gmail.com